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FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN MEDICAL TREATMENT:
RECONSIDERING THE EFFICACY REQUIREMENT
OF THE FDCA
INTRODUCTION
In 1962, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 was
amended to add the requirement that new drugs be proven effective
as well as safe.' Recent controversy over the cancer drug laetrile has
raised serious questions concerning the requirement that new drugs
be shown effective by substantial evidence before receiving Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) approval.' Laetrile supporters, for
instance, contend that the procedures necessary to establish effec-
tiveness and secure FDA approval delay or prevent new drugs from
reaching the market, and thereby restrict individual freedom of
choice in medical treatment. Using laetrile as an example, this Note
will examine the procedures for securing approval of new drugs, and
the methods through which individuals can obtain review of the
statutory provisions. Recent legislative and judicial confrontations
with freedom of choice in medical treatment will also be examined.
Finally, the article will discuss the relevant portions of the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), with special emphasis on the pro-
visions which may already provide adequate protection to the con-
sumer in the absence of an efficacy requirement.
THE EFFICACY REQUIREMENT
Laetrile is used extensively in Mexico, where it is recognized as
both effective and safe.3 However, the cancer drug has not been
approved for distribution in the United States. Although there are
compelling testimonials to laetrile's curative capabilities,4 this evi-
dence is not relevant in an FDA determination whether the drug is
effective.5
No pharmaceutical firm has yet taken the initiative to conduct
the investigational tests required by the FDA, or to submit a New
Drug Application (NDA) for laetrile. As a result, cancer patients
have become victims of a procedural tangle. Patients have been
1. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1970).
2. Id.
3. For a thorough discussion of the history of laetrile, also known as vitamin B17, amyg-
dalin, or prunasin, see M. CULBERT, VITAMIN B17 78-80 (1974).
4. Chicago Sun-Times, April 27, 1977, at 3, col. 3.
5. Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Richardson, 318 F. Supp. 301, 309-10 (D. Del.
1970). But see Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645 (1972). The Court
in that case stated: "It may, of course, be true that in some cases general recognition that a
drug is efficacious might be made without the kind of scientific support necessary to obtain
approval of an NDA." Id. at 652-53.
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unable to persuade the FDA to act on their behalf, and have found
no support from drug manufacturers who are in a position to comply
with FDA procedures.6 Unlike the individual patient, most drug
manufacturers have the facilities and resources to conduct the ex-
tensive, long-term testing which is necessary to establish a drug's
effectiveness.
The efficacy requirement has been criticized as sound in theory
but unworkable in practice, since the principle question has become
"Can the product be demonstrated to be effective in certain highly
sophisticated, structured, and constantly changing tests, which
probably neither the Congress, the FDA, nor the industry ever
dreamed of at the time they all happily supported the concept that
industry should indeed prove its drugs efficacious?"' FDA guide-
lines for testing and evaluating new drugs are frequently revised. A
new drug, therefore, may have to be tested more than once to com-
ply with the most recent standards. These circumstances have
caused drug manufacturers who originally favored an efficacy test
to become dissatisfied with the FDA's implementation of the testing
concept.'
Although drug manufacturers are concerned with the complicated
testing regulations for new drugs, the FDA requirement also pre-
sents serious problems for physicians. Doctors must choose between
respecting an FDA ban on an unapproved new drug or giving that
drug to patients in the belief that it will save lives.'
Numerous hearings before state legislatures concerning the lae-
trile issue demonstrate that a strong demand for the drug exists. 10
A few federal district courts have entered orders authorizing the use
of laetrile on a case-by-case basis." However, the central problem
6. The FDA assigned an Investigative New Drug (IND) application in April, 1970, to the
McNaughton Foundation to test laetrile. Ten days later, permission was suddenly revoked
by the FDA, allegedly after pressure from Surgeon General Jesse Steinfeld, a California
physician who was also involved in the California Medical Association ban on the drug in
the 1950's. The FDA stated that a review of the IND disclosed some serious preclinical
deficiencies. A notice was issued advising the Foundation of the deficiencies and allowing
them ten days in which to request a conference or correct them. It did neither, and the IND
was terminated on May 12, 1970. See M. CULBERT, VrrAMIN B17 81 (1974). However, according
to the head of the National Cancer Institute's cytochemistry division, the IND application
was superior in content to most IND applications granted to one of the largest research
organizations in the nation. Id.
7. Clark, Accelerating Change, 1 J. LAw & Ma. 41 (1973).
8. Id. at 43.
9. In a letter to the editor, J. Bohorfoush, M.D., F.C.C.P., expresses his extreme frustra-
tion in this dilemma. 70 CHEST 407 (Sept. 1976).
10. Chicago Sun-Times, April 27, 1977, at 3, col. 2.
11. Rutherford v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Okla. 1976), aff'd and
remanded, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976). See also Chicago Sun-Times, June 17, 1977, at 24,
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remains that, because laetrile has not been approved by the FDA,
distribution of the drug carries criminal sanctions.
THE FDA's POSITION
In response to criticism from laetrile supporters, the FDA has
repeatedly taken the position that the effectiveness of a drug is
inseparable from considerations of safety.' For example, Dr. Robert
Young, FDA chief medical officer for anticancer drugs, has warned
that permitting use of laetrile for cancer treatment would divert
patients from conventional methods of treatment. In his opinion,
availability of laetrile would cause patients to rely on a useless drug
rather than on conventional treatments. However, Dr. Young's ar-
gument presupposes that conventional treatments are curative, so
that if a patient rejects them in favor of laetrile, he will suffer
otherwise avoidable harm. It follows from Dr. Young's argument,
therefore, that laetrile must be shown effective by the FDA stan-
dards before it can be permitted to lure patients from conventional
treatments, such as radiation and surgery, which do not have to
meet the same tests of effectiveness.
If laetrile is to be measured against other cancer treatments in
determining its "new drug" status, a relative efficacy test would
result. Such a test, however, clearly contravenes the legislative in-
tent that the efficacy requirement apply to claims made for the
drug, not to its relative position among available treatments. 4 Pres-
ently, conventional cancer-treatment methods do not have to be,
and have not been, proven effective. Therefore, Dr. Young's argu-
ment fails to establish a justification for a total ban on laetrile.
THE 1962 AMENDMENTS TO THE FOOD, DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT OF
1938
Federal regulation of the drug industry began with enactment of
the Food and Drugs Act of 1906,1 which did not require pre-market
testing of drugs. It was not until 1938, when more than 100 persons
col. 1, which reports the decision of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Du Page County,
Illinois to authorize the use of laetrile for a cancer patient.
12. Before the 1962 amendments, the FDA was already requiring a showing as to the
drug's effectiveness as part of a determination that the drug was safe, if it was offered for
use in the treatment of a life-threatening disease. S. REP. No. 1744, 87th Cong. 2d Sess., 2,
15 reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2884, 2891 [hereinafter cited as U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws]. See also Durovic v. Richardson, 479 F.2d 242 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 944, reh. denied, 414 U.S. 1088 (1973).
13. Chicago Sun-Times, April 27, 1977, at 3, col. 3.
14. See U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 12, at 2892.
15. Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
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died after taking "elixir of sulfanilamide"'" that attention was di-
rected to pre-market testing of new drugs. That disaster paved the
way for enactment of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of
1938 which requires pre-market testing of drugs to establish their
safety for use under the conditions set forth on the label. The 1938
Act prohibited the introduction into interstate commerce of any new
drug unless a New Drug Application filed with the FDA was opera-
tive,'8 but there was no requirement that the drug be proven effec-
tive for its intended use.
Another drug-related disaster influenced enactment of the
Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments of 1962.'1 Sharply strengthened
safety controls were enacted as a result of a thalidomide scare,20
which escalated during hearings on the amendments. In what might
be considered an overreaction to the thalidomide tragedy, the
amendments added the requirement that new drugs be proven effec-
tive as well as safe before securing FDA approval. The efficacy
requirement, however, did not logically follow, since the risks asso-
ciated with thalidomide were unrelated to its effectiveness as a sed-
ative. The only function served by the efficacy requirement appears
to be to provide more required testing time in which adverse side-
effects may appear.
Drug Testing to Establish Effectiveness
By the time a new drug is approved by the FDA, it has been
thoroughly tested in both animals and humans. The FDA requires
that sufficient animal studies be performed initially to show that
the drug is reasonably safe for human testing.' Before human tests
16. R. STYN, A Dichotomy in Consumer Protection-The Drug-Device Definition
Dilemma, 44 IND. L.J. 48, 49 (1969).
17. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1041 (1938), as amended, 21
U.S.C. § 355 (1970).
18. 52 Stat. 1041, 1052 (1938).
19. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780. (1962).
20. Thalidomide became a popular new sedative in Western Europe, England and Canada
but, during 1961, the birth of 3,500 to 5,000 malformed babies motivated studies by four
German universities. The drug was found to cause phocomelia, "seal limbs," in babies whose
mothers took the drug in early pregnancy. See U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 12,
at 2905.
A thalidomide NDA was filed on Sept. 12, 1960. Several months later the FDA medical
officer handling the application, Dr. Frances Kelsey, noticed a report in the British Medical
Journal of instances where patients receiving thalidomide had developed inflammation of
nerves in their hands and feet. She therefore delayed approval of the drug. It was not until
March 8, 1962, after repeated delays by the FDA, that the sponsor withdrew the application.
There appeared to be no dispute that thalidomide was an effective sedative. U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, supra note 12, at 2907-08.
21. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(1) (1970).
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begin, the drug sponsor" must submit a "Notice of Claimed Investi-
gational Exemption for a New Drug" (IND) to the FDA. 3 Once the
application is approved, the manufacturer may distribute the drug
for the limited purpose of conducting the investigational tests. The
results of these tests are submitted with a New Drug Application
seeking approval to market the drug. 4 All stages of human testing
must comply with stringent FDA standards. The FDA will not ap-
prove a new drug application for several reasons: if the tests are
inadequate; if the results of tests show that the drug is unsafe; if the
method of manufacture is inadequate to preserve the identity,
strength, quality and purity of the drug; if all the available informa-
tion is insufficient to determine safety and effectiveness; or if the
labeling is false and misleading in any respect."
The 1962 amendments contain an exemption for a drug if "at any
time prior to the enactment of this chapter it was subject to the
Food and Drugs Act of June 30, 1906, as amended, and if at such
time its labeling contained the same representations concerning
conditions of its use." 6 Thus, the definition of a new drug would not
apply to drugs which were never subject to the new drug procedure,
i.e., drugs which were on the market before the pre-market testing
requirement of the 1938 Act.27 Drugs which had been approved
under the 1938 Act were not required under transitional provisions
to resubmit NDA's, but they were not exempt from the efficacy
requirement." Under section 355(e)(3) 21 the FDA is authorized to
order drugs with prior approval off the market if after a two year
grace period the FDA finds, on the basis of new information, that
the drug is ineffective. °
22. "Sponsor" is defined as a "person or agency who assumes responsibility for an investi-
gation of a new drug, including responsibility for compliance with applicable provisions of
the act and regulations." 21 C.F.R. § 310.3(j) (1977).
23. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1970). See also note 24 infra.
24. Id. § 355(b). See also 21 C.F.R. § 314.1 (1977), which describes the form of applications
and sets forth an example. The application must include a table of contents, a summary
showing that the application is well organized, sufficiently tabulated, and statistically ana-
lyzed; an evaluation of safety and effectiveness including references to the volume and page
number in the application where supporting reports can be found; copies of the label; a
statement of any limitations on use; a full list of ingredients and substances used in manufac-
ture; a full description of methods used in manufacture, processing and packing; samples of
the drug and components; full reports of investigational testing; and a list of investigators.
25. Id. § 355(d)(1)-(6); 21 C.F.R. § 314.111 (1977).
26. Id. § 32 1(p)(1).
27. Id. § 321 (Historical Note, Effectiveness and Safety of New Drugs).
28. Id.
29. Id. § 355(e)(3).
30. It was this provision which enabled the FDA to review the hundreds of drugs which
were approved without regard to their efficacy between 1938 and 1962.
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Standard of Proof for Effectiveness
Section 355(a) provides that "No person shall introduce or deliver
for introduction into interstate commerce any new drug, unless an
approval of an application . . . is effective with respect to such
drug."' Section 355(d) lists the circumstances upon which the Sec-
retary of Health, Education and Welfare shall refuse an applica-
tion. Included is the provision for refusal if there is a lack of
"substantial evidence" that the drug will have the effect it is repre-
sented to have.32  "Substantial evidence" is defined to mean
"evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations,
including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific
training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug
involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be
concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it
purports or is represented to have. '33 The FDA has promulgated
regulations which describe the kind of evidence it deems necessary
to meet the "substantial evidence" test for effectiveness.34 Other
regulations limit the right to a hearing on the approvability of new
drugs to applicants who have proffered some evidence meeting the
standards.31
A new drug is defined under section 321(p) as one "not generally
recognized among experts qualified by scientific training and ex-
perience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe
and effective for use under conditions prescribed . . . or suggested
in the labeling thereof. '3 Although the Act does not define "gener-
ally recognized," it does not mean "unanimously recognized. '37
Courts have interpreted the phrase to require at least substantial
evidence of effectiveness supported by adequate and well controlled
investigations .3 Drugs which have become generally recognized only
through investigational testing are considered new drugs.39 Any drug
which has not been widely used cannot be generally recognized as
safe and effective. Thus, all newly developed drugs are "new drugs"
31. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1970).
32. Id. § 355(d)(5).
33. Id. § 355(d).
34. 21 C.F.R. § 314.1 (1977). See also note 24 supra.
35. Id. § 314.200.
36. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (1970).
37. United States v. An article of Drug, "Bentex Ulcerine," 469 F.2d 875 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 938 (1973).
38. Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott and Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 629 (1973). See also
Weinberger v. Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 652 (1973).
39. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(2) (1970).
210 [Vol. 9
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within the meaning of the Act.40
Congress did not intend to require uncontradicted evidence of
effectiveness. "When a drug has been adequately tested by qualified
experts and has been found to have the effect claimed, this claim
should be permitted even though there may be preponderant evi-
dence to the contrary based upon equally reliable studies."'" There-
fore, a substantial split of opinion among experts should not defeat
an NDA. The purpose of the efficacy requirement is to insure that
safe new drugs become available so long as their effectiveness is
supported by a responsible body of opinion."
CHALLENGING THE EFFICACY REQUIREMENT
The Due Process Challenge
Since individual patients are generally unable to comply with
NDA requirements, some have sought judicial intervention to reas-
sess the NDA procedures. Courts, however, have been reluctant to
interfere in the absence of prior FDA action." The heart of the
statutory procedure is the grant of primary jurisdiction to the FDA,
subject to judicial review when administrative remedies are ex-
hausted. Courts have consistently interpreted the FDA's authority
to include determinations whether a drug is a "new drug" within the
meaning of the Act44 and whether there is sufficient evidence to
establish efficacy.45 The FDA has also been given the right to deter-
mine whether a drug sponsor is entitled to a hearing on the issue of
efficacy.4"
Section 355 also provides for an administrative hearing prior to
denial of a new drug application. However, this provision has been
said not to contemplate a proceeding leading to a final administra-
tive order subject to statutory judicial review.47
40. See Merritt Corp. v. Folsom, 165 F. Supp. 418 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
41. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 12, at 2892.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Rutherford v. American Medical Ass'n, 379 F.2d 641, 643 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1043 (1967).
44. Ciba Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640 (1973); accord, Weinberger v. Hynson, West-
cott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973).
45. 412 U.S. at 617.
46. The Act requires that notice and an opportunity for a hearing be given the applicant
when an NDA is disapproved, 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(d) (1970), or when prior approval is with-
drawn, 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1970).
47. Durovic v. Richardson, 479 F.2d 242 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 944 (1973).
Section 355(c) provides that "within 180 days after the filing of an application, or such
additional period as may be agreed on by the Secretary and the applicant," the Secretary
shall either approve the NDA or give notice of an opportunity for a hearing on the question
of whether the application is approvable. If after notice and opportunity for a hearing, the
1977]
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Because of the FDA's complete control of the NDA procedures,
attempts by individuals to obtain new, unproven drugs, or to com-
ply with FDA requirements for approval of drugs, are often stymied.
Section 355(b) provides, "Any person may file with the Secretary
an application,"48 but that application must be accompanied by full
reports of investigations made to show whether the drug is safe and
effective, a full list of the drug's components, a full statement of the
drug's composition, a full description of methods used in manufac-
turing, processing and packing the drug, and samples of the drug.4"
The sponsor is responsible for pre-market testing of the new drug
under controlled conditions which satisfy FDA standards. After the
manufacturer's application and data have been studied by the New
Drug branch of the Bureau of Medicine of the FDA, the NDA is
either approved" or refused, 5' after the sponsor has been given no-
tice and an opportunity to be heard.
Under section 371(a) of the Act, the Secretary has authority to
promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of the Act.52 In
addition to the statutory demands, the sponsor of a new drug must
comply with extensive regulations. For example, the Secretary, pur-
suant to regulation, has the authority to reject an NDA where it is
shown that the drug was tested under insufficiently controlled con-
ditions.53
It is apparent that most individuals lack the facilities and re-
sources necessary to comply with the FDA standards and to effec-
tively sponsor a new drug. To compensate for the inability to obtain
FDA approval of certain cancer drugs, patients have sought judicial
assistance. In Rutherford v. American Medical Association,5 4 indi-
vidual cancer patients brought an action in federal court after spon-
sors of krebiozen, a drug thought helpful in cancer treatment, failed
to obtain FDA approval. The plaintiff alleged that the FDA placed
impossible or unreasonable conditions on approval of new drugs.
The district court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, "Without
an attempted good faith application for approval or exemption, we
Secretary finds a lack of substantial evidence that the drug is effective, the application is
refused. 21 USC § 355(c) (1970).
48. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1970). Delegation of authority to the Commissioner regarding
NDA's is found in 21 C.F.R. §§ 5.1 et seq. (1977).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 365(b) (1970); 21 C.F.R. § 314.1 (1977).
50. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(1) (1970).
51. Id. § 355(b).
52. Id. § 371(a).
53. 21 C.F.R. § 314.111 (1977).
54. 379 F.2d 641 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1043 (1967).
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have no jurisdiction to determine whether the FDA has illegally
placed impossible or unreasonable conditions on approval or exemp-
tion. . . .,,. Although the plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality
of the NDA procedure rather than a specific FDA order, the court
held that FDA action was a prerequisite to invoking the court's
jurisdiction. Therefore, individuals are forced to rely on drug manu-
facturers to submit NDA's for FDA action before the court will
consider the procedure which those individuals are challenging.
"Until someone has attempted to comply with the Act . . .plain-
tiffs appeal should be to the sponsors of the drug. ' 56 This advice
does not benefit laetrile supporters, since the drug has no sponsor.
Individual cancer patients were unsuccessful in another Seventh
Circuit case, Tutoki v. Celebrezze,11 in which it was determined that
"An essential element of proof by plaintiffs would be a showing that
if the FDA had passed on Krebiozen . . .it would have been ap-
proved or exempted." 8 As the decision indicates, plaintiffs would
have to demonstrate in district court a substantial probability that
a particular drug can be shown to be effective and safe.59 Such a
showing would apparently require evidence similar to that required
by NDA procedure. However, the district court is an improper place
for that demonstration. Although relief sought in a court of appeals
"presupposes a determination by the district court that Krebiozen
should be approved. . . .[t]his determination is a matter within
the primary jurisdiction of the FDA." 0 In Tutoki, the court indi-
cated that the judgment was without prejudice to any future pro-
ceeding for injunctive relief under 22 U.S.C. § 371(f), to enforce
their alleged right to an FDA determination as to any application
they filed."' Therefore, the plaintiffs were turned full circle back to
the FDA, and consequently to the "drug sponsor."
Relief was also denied laetrile supporters in Hanson v. United
States.62 While the district court noted that the plaintiffs were drug
distributors rather than individual consumers, there was no indica-
tion that the distributors had the means necessary to comply with
55. Application had been made under § 355(i) for an exemption for investigational use in
1963, later withdrawn, and again in 1966. 379 F.2d at 643. Presumably neither sufficiently
complied to be considered a good faith application to give the court jurisdiction.
56. 379 F.2d at 643.
57. 375 F.2d 105 (7th Cir. 1967).
58. Id. at 107; accord, Rutherford v. American Medical Ass'n, 379 F.2d 641, 643 (7th Cir.
1967).
59. Hanson v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 30, 36 (D. Minn.), aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2d
947 (8th Cir. 1976).
60. 375 F.2d at 107.
61. Id. at 107.
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FDA regulations or that suit by an individual consumer would have
required a different result."
Despite the requirements for invoking the jurisdiction of the court
of appeals in FDA cases,64 an alternative means of review is provided
by the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 In Rutherford v. United
States,"e the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an injunction
issued by the district court against FDA interference with the use
of laetrile. The district court had held that patients were denied
freedom of choice for treatment of cancer, and were deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law. 7 The trial court
found that laetrile was effective in curing this particular plaintiff's
cancer, a determination other courts ordinarily deferred to the FDA.
Furthermore, it was held that the FDA regulations made it virtually
impossible for an individual to have an NDA processed, and that
Congress intended the FDA to either approve or disapprove the use
of laetrile on its own initiative and in good faith. 8 Since the FDA
abdicated its duty to make a clear determination regarding laetrile,
and inaction was said to amount to disapproval, the court acquired
jurisdiction over the matter.6 FDA inaction was recognized as an
effective denial of the patients' right of free choice, since they were
wholly without the means or resources needed to comply with provi-
sions of section 355(b).70 Jurisdiction was partially based on a show-
ing of hardship since plaintiff's use of laetrile would subject him to
criminal prosecution, whereas failure to use it might cost him his
life.7 Jurisdiction was also predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1337.72
62. 417 F. Supp. 30 (D. Minn.), aff'd per curiam, 540 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1976).
63. Id. at 37.
64. Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137, 1143 (10th Cir. 1976). 21 U.S.C. § 371(f)(1)
(1970), provides that a person "adversely affected" by an order of the Secretary may file a
petition for review in the proper court of appeals in a case of actual controversy. A related
provision is embodied in 21 U.S.C. § 355(h) (1970).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 705 (1970).
66. 399 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (W.D. Okla. 1975), aff'd and remanded, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th
Cir. 1976).
67. 399 F. Supp. at 1213.
68. Id. at 1212.
69. Id. The United States Supreme Court also stated that the FDA, by reason of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 544(e) "may issue a declaratory order to terminate
a controversy over a 'new drug' or remove any uncertainty whether a particular drug is a 'new
drug'. . . ." Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 626 (1973).
See also Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). That order is reviewable under
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-704 (1970), see 412 U.S. at 627.
70. 399 F. Supp. at 1213.
71. Id. at 1214. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970), provides, "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or
protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies."
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The Tenth Circuit did not reach the issue of laetrile's effective-
ness or the constitutionality of the NDA provisions, but confined its
inquiry to the procedures involved.73 Two FDA determinations were
differentiated. The first was a determination whether a drug is a
new drug or exempt under the grandfather clause from the NDA
procedures.7" The second was whether a drug is shown to be effective
and safe. Whereas the latter is a determination which can be made
only after a new drug application is filed with the FDA, the first is
not and thus could be fully tried. Since the FDA determination that
laetrile is a new drug was made without citing any facts whatsoever
to support that decision, it was entirely proper for the district court
to entertain the case.75 The court of appeals upheld the injunction
and remanded the case for hearings to enable the FDA to make a
record and allow laetrile proponents to express their views.7"
Although the Rutherford decision appears to be encouraging to
laetrile proponents, its actual value to those seeking approval for
laetrile is limited. If the FDA determines after hearings that laetrile
is a new drug, the NDA procedure must be complied with. If the
FDA finds that laetrile is exempt under the grandfather clause, it
can order the drug off the market on the basis that laetrile is not
effective for treating cancer as claimed on the label.77
The Right of Privacy Challenge
The recent controversy over laetrile raises further constitutional
questions concerning a patient's decision to use an unproven drug.
Although the right to privacy arguably encompasses that decision,
courts have been reluctant to respond to that challenge.
The Constitution does not explicitly set forth a right of privacy,
yet the Supreme Court has long recognized it as an aspect of indi-
73. 542 F.2d at 1138.
74. See text accompanying notes 26 through 28 supra.
75. 542 F.2d at 1143. See also Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott and Dunning, Inc., 412
U.S. 609, 625-27 (1973).
76. The FDA Commissioner concluded that laetrile is a new drug within the meaning of
that Act and is not exempt under the grandfather clauses. The court has yet to rule on the
matter. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,768 (Aug. 5, 1977).
77. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(6) (1970). 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (1970) provides that a drug is mis-
branded if its label is false or misleading in any particular. 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1) (1970)
provides that a misbranded drug is subject to seizure.
78. In Rutherford v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208, 1214 (W.D. Okla. 1975), aff'd and
remanded, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976), the district court raised the right of privacy but
the court of appeals did not reach the issue.
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vidual liberty79 protected by the due process clauses of the fifth 0 and
fourteenth8' amendments. 8 The right has been held to include "the
interest in independence in making certain kinds of decisions." 3
Entitled to this coverage are personal decisions regarding abortion, 4
marriage, 5 contraception,86 child rearing and education, 7 family
relationships," and procreation."'
The patient's choice of a particular course of medical treatment
should be no less entitled to Constitutional protection than a
woman's decision to terminate pregnancy. 0 Although the right to
make fundamental decisions is not absolute, the right to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusions is implicit in the right
of privacy.9 There are situations, however, where the government's
interest in the health of its citizens may override the individual's
prerogative to make certain decisions. However, the governmental
interference must be justified by a compelling interest, and legisla-
tion "must be narrowly drawn to express only legitimate state inter-
ests. . . ."" Thus, regulations must be drafted to avoid intrusion
79. Although a right of privacy was recognized as early as 1891, see Union Pacific R. Co.
v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), there was no explicit recognition until Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold held that the privacy right existed in the penum-
bra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights "formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance." Id. at 484. This has been held to include the right
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into such fundamental matters as the
decision on whether to bear a child. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 453, 453 (1972).
80. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
82. The right to privacy may arguably be found in other amendments as well:
In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least
the roots of that right in the First Amendment, . . . in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments, . . . in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights . . . . in the Ninth
Amendment, . . . or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment...
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
83. Whalen v. Roe, 97 S. Ct. 869, 876 (1977).
84. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
85. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
86. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 453, 453 (1972).
87. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923).
88. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
89. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
90. Presumably the right of privacy is sufficiently broad to encompass a patient's decision
to decline medical treatment. In In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 255 A.2d 647 (1976), the father of
a young woman whose vital life functions were being artificially sustained, petitioned the
court for a determination whether the life sustaining machinery should be turned off. The
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the termination decision was protected by the right of
privacy. Id. at 27, 255 A.2d at 664.
91. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
92. See text accompanying notes 120 through 121 infra.
93. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973).
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into the area of protected individual rights, with less burdensome
alternatives employed where they will achieve the desired goals."
Regulations substantially limiting access to contraceptives and
thereby burdening an individual's decision to prevent contracep--
tion, were therefore invalidated in a recent Supreme Court opinion
because they were not justified by a compelling state interest."
In Whalen v. Roe,9" the Supreme Court upheld a New York stat-
ute 7 under which a centralized computer record is maintained with
names and addresses of all persons who obtain by prescription cer-
tain drugs for which there is both a legal and illegal market. Physi-
cians and patients argued that the statute invaded the right of
privacy,9" alleging that some persons will decline needed medication
because of their fear that "the misuse of the computerized data will
cause them to be stigmatized as 'drug addicts.' "I While finding no
violation of the right of privacy, the Court nevertheless made two
significant points. First, the New York statute had not "deprived
[any individual] of the right to decide independently, with the
advice of his physician, to acquire and use needed medication,"'' 00
and second, the statute did not impose requirements of advance
approval before use of the drug could be prescribed. 0'
Unlike the regulatory scheme of Whalen, the efficacy requirement
for new drugs does place an "advance approval" obstacle in the path
of patients seeking new drug treatment alternatives. In addition, the
procedure for securing advance approval is far more complex and
burdensome than others invalidated by the Court.0 2 Thus, not only
must a patient await FDA approval before a particular drug treat-
ment alternative is available, but he also has no means to initiate
FDA consideration of the new drug. Furthermore, a cancer patient
seeking to use laetrile is in a different situation than a New York
94. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
95. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 97 S. Ct. 2010, 2019-20 (1977).
96. 97 S. Ct. 869 (1977).
97. 1972 N.Y. Laws, c. 878; N.Y. Pub. Health Laws §§ 3300 et. seq. (McKinney, Vol. 44,
1975-76 Supp.).
98. Cases characterized as protecting privacy have involved at least two different kinds
of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters and
another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of fundamental decisions. 97
S. Ct. at 876.
99. Id. at 874.
100. Id. at 878.
101. An advance approval requirement relating to abortions had been invalidated in Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). That statute required written consent from two state-licensed
physicians, other than the patient's personal physician, and advance approval of a committee
of not less than three members of the hospital staff where the procedure was to be performed.
102. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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patient whose choice of drugs may be somewhat burdened by con-
cern about a computer record. The cancer patient faces a total bar
to certain alternatives, and thus to a meaningful choice.",''
Congressional Justifications
In Carey v. Population Services International,'04 the Supreme
Court invalidated regulations which limited access to contracep-
tives'0  because New York had not shown a compelling interest to
justify the burden on access. 06 Although the "compelling state in-
terest" test may not apply to an act of Congress, the rights of the
individual are fundamental whether they be under state or federal
regulation. The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 was enacted
pursuant to congressional authority to regulate interstate com-
merce. 07 The power of Congress to determine the means necessary
to implement its purpose in preventing interstate shipment of
harmful articles was recognized when the 1906 Act was challenged
in McDermott v. Wisconsin. '" Thereafter, in United States v.
Sullivan, '9 the Act dealing with labeling of drugs shipped in inter-
state commerce was validated. Both of those cases involved regula-
tions reasonably calculated to promote the purpose of assuring that
only safe drugs reach the consumer, and neither of those cases in-
volved the issue of protected individual rights. Yet, where other
federal statutes have endangered fundamental interests, the Su-
preme Court has struck down those provisions."10
The interest advanced by Congress to justify the 1962 amend-
ments to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, was to "bring
about better, safer medicine and to establish a more effective sys-
tem of enforcement of the drug laws.""' In view of the thalidomide
disaster, 1 2 it is reasonable to assume that safety was the primary
concern behind the amendments. Thalidomide evidently could have
been shown to be an effective sedative without removing the pre-
103. Whalen indicated, however, that the state probably could prohibit entirely the use
of certain drugs. 97 S. Ct. at 878. Apparently prohibition would be based on the potential
dangerousness of those drugs. Reference is made to opium, cocaine, methadone, amphetam-
ines and methaqualone. Id. at 873 n.8.
104. 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977).
105. Id. at 2015-18.
106. Id. at 2019.
107. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
108. 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
109. 332 U.S. 689 (1948).
110. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (right to travel); La-
mont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (right to receive information and ideas).
111. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 12, at 2884.
112. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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natal dangers which developed. The government's interest in regu-
lating which drugs will reach the market is substantial when safety
is the concern. The ability of the individual or physician to foresee
potential side-effects is extremely limited, and a trial and error
method of determining a drug's safety once it is on the market would
have terrible consequences. However, where efficacy is concerned
the interest is substantially diminished. The regulation is no longer
designed to protect the unwary consumer from a harmful product,
but to protect a knowing consumer from a potentially "harmful"
choice by which he may abandon established methods of treatment.
Trial and error testing of a safe drug on the market to determine
effectiveness may have disappointing consequences, but ineffective-
ness is a foreseeable result which a patient and his responsible phy-
sician necessarily will consider in consultation.
FDA Justifications
The efficacy requirement and procedures involved may not ac-
tually serve the articulated purpose of bringing about safer and
better medicine. Admittedly, it assures the consumer that certain
technical investigational procedures have been complied with be-
fore the drug is made available, but it can also serve to encourage
relaxation of standards by previously responsible par-
ties-physician, patient, and pharmacist. The FDA, faced with the
significance which the public will attach to its approvals, may be
so cautious as to seriously delay the availability of new life saving
drugs. In the meantime, patients suffer. Some die who may have
been saved and others find that when the drug is finally approved,
their disease has progressed beyond the point where the drug would
benefit them."'
The FDA's argument, that availability of an unproven drug will
lure patients from conventional treatments, necessarily involves a
value judgement that conventional treatments are better for the
patient. However, if the patient and doctor are adequately informed
that a particular drug has not been proven effective, they will be in
a better position than the FDA to make that value judgement. Were
a cancer patient to take laetrile without effecting a cure, the reason-
able question should not be whether availability of that drug caused
him to forego other treatment, but whether he was sufficiently in-
formed of the drug's status to make a reasoned decision.
In arriving at that decision, a patient and doctor can arrive at an
individualized determination, as opposed to the FDA's broad deter-
113. See J. BOHORFOUSH, Letter to the Editor, 70 CHEST 407 (Sept. 1976).
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mination which must await long term testing and investigational
procedures by a drug sponsor. The physician must consider treat-
ment alternatives in light of the particular patient's situation. The
consequences of conventional methods"' are such that a person suf-
fering from cancer may choose to forego treatment altogether be-
cause he does not wish to submit to presently available treatments.
Surgical treatment for cancerous tumors frequently requires sacri-
ficing body parts without an assurance of recovery." 5 Radiation in-
volves many risks and does not enjoy certainty of success."6 An
important consideration is the degree to which the individual's can-
cer has progressed, since one who has been pronounced terminally
ill with no hope of recovery has little to lose in trying an unproven
new drug. It.is difficult to comprehend how the government's inter-
est in efficacy could supersede that patient's right of self determina-
tion.
Assessing the Justifications
At some point the government's interest may become more per-
suasive. For example, in the abortion situation, the Supreme Court
has held that the state's interest increases as the pregnancy ad-
vances."7 Where conventional cancer treatment in the early stages
of the disease involves minimal bodily invasion, and the chances of
recovery are good, the argument can be made that the interest in
encouraging those methods may be sufficient to overcome the indi-
vidual's interest in self determination."" As the disease progresses
and conventional methods involve greater bodily invasion and less
probability of recovery, the government's interest may be less com-
pelling.
The difficulty with this line of reasoning is that, unlike preg-
nancy, cancer stages are not uniform. Medical opinions differ, and
the effect of an unproven drug will vary from one individual to the
next, since "even a placebo can be highly efficacious in the right
patient."'"'
Presumably, an individual's physician will consider the probabil-
ity of success if conventional treatment is employed and make rec-
114. See generally BROOK, UNDERSTANDING CANCER 85-91 (1973).
115. PRESCOTT, CANCER, THE MISGUIDED CELL (1973).
116. Id. at 83. The conventional approach is radiation and chemotherapy. "[Tihese
methods are so marginally effective that no optimistic assault on cancer incidents and death
rate statistics has been ,made." CULBERT, supra note 3, at 49, 139.
117. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
118. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 27, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976).
119. Dornette, The FDA and the Supreme Court, 1 J. LEG. MED. 6 (1973).
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ommendations accordingly. Proper warnings regarding the drug's
unproven status, given to the physician and the patient, should be
sufficient to insure that conventional methods will be relied upon
when they offer the best opportunity for recovery.
The government's concern that access to unproven drugs will mis-
lead unwary patients may be unwarranted. The government reasons
that a substantial harm will result from non-reliance on established
methods of treatment. Hence, in the absence of proof of resulting
harm, the policy behind the efficacy requirement and the intrusion
into the individual's right to make certain fundamental decisions
becomes unjustified.
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act Alternative
The United States Supreme Court has held that where funda-
mental individual rights are involved, least restrictive alternatives
should be employed. 20 Under section 355(d) of the FDCA, if a drug
is not proven effective, access to that new drug is denied. It has been
held in other situations that rules limiting access to medical treat-
ment have a "'maximum destrictive impact' on privacy rights."''
For example, Supreme Court decisions have held unconstitutional
statutes that limited in a variety of ways a woman's access to con-
traceptives. In Carey, 12 the Court declared a state statute unconsti-
tutional not "because there is an independent 'right of access to
contraceptives,' but because such access is essential to exercise of
the constitutionally protected right of decision in matters of child-
bearing. .. ."
It follows that possible alternatives to a total ban on an unproven
new drug must not so limit access to the drug as to deny the patient
a realistic choice. Regulations must be tailored to serve the govern-
mental interest and respect the individual exercise of the right of
self determination.
The efficacy requirement is not essential to the government's in-
terest of insuring that only safe drugs reach the consumer."2 ' Nor is
it necessary to prevent the consumer from being misled by false
120. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
121. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) the Court stated that by
"forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale," the
Connecticut statute had a "maximum destructive impact" on privacy rights.
122. 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977).
123. Id. at 2018. Section 6811 of the New York Education Law reviewed in Carey made it
a crime: (1) for any person to sell or distribute any contraceptive to a minor under 16, (2) for
anyone other than a licensed pharmacist to distribute contraceptives to a person over 16, and
(3) for anyone, including a licensed pharmacist, to advertise or display contraceptives.
124. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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claims of effectiveness. Labeling regulations embodied in the Act
provide a viable alternative to the requirement of a pre-market
showing of effectiveness. Under the Act, drugs which have not been
proven effective are required to state that fact on the label to avoid
misleading the consumer.' 5 In the Senate reports to the 1962
amendments, the provisions regarding false or misleading labeling
were said to already include effectiveness: "[W]ith respect to effec-
tiveness of the drug, the labeling of a drug claimed to be effective
for particular disease conditions. . . would also have to make a full
disclosure as to its [the drug's] usefulness and the limitations in
the scientific evidence to support its use."' 20
Although the efficacy requirement would no longer apply to the
NDA procedure, labeling is presently effected by the NDA provi-
sions of the Act which can remain unchanged. The FDA may refuse
approval to a new drug if the label is false or misleading.' 7 There
are regulations to implement the various labeling requirements. 28 If
the drug sponsor does not present substantial evidence of efficacy,
the FDA can require specific warnings that the drug has not been
proven effective for its intended use.
Section 352(a) provides that a drug is misbranded if its label is
false or misleading in any way.'" In determining whether a label is
misleading, the FDA will consider not only representations made or
suggested, but also the extent to which the labeling fails to reveal
facts which are material in light of those representations. 3 0 There-
fore, if the ability of a drug to effectively treat a particular condition
has not been established, that fact must be revealed on the label,
or the drug will be deemed to be misbranded.
In addition to section 352(a) controls, certain labeling procedures
can be established under the authority granted in 21 U.S.C. § 371
to promulgate regulations. One approach would be to require pack-
age inserts with appropriate warnings.' 3' Of course, the intended
purpose of a particular drug will determine to a great extent the
nature of the warnings to be required on the label.
In order to insure that the warning contained in the label or pack-
age insert is adequate to both physician and patient, section 352(c)
125. 21 U.S.C. § 352 (a) (1970).
126. U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 12, at 2893.
127. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(6) (1970).
128. 21 C.F.R. § 201.100 (1976).
129. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (1970).
130. Id. § 321(n).
131. A suggested warning might read: "This drug may not be effective for its intended
use, and delay in seeking other treatments is discouraged."
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provides that information which the Act requires to appear on the
label must be conspicuous and in a form which is understandable
to the ordinary individual. 3 '
Other provisions of the Act clarify requirements as to certain
types of drugs. In section 8 12 ,13 a schedule of controlled substances
is set forth. Presently, there are five schedules. If Congress deter-
mines that labeling regulations would provide inadequate protec-
tion, it can create a "Schedule VI" for drugs of unproven effective-
ness which may cause persons to forego accepted treatments. That
schedule can then be incorporated into provisions which Would be
appropriate. For example, a limited prescription can be required
under section 829(b) which, by amendment, would include the
newly created schedule. Section 829(b) presently provides:
Except when dispensed directly by a practitioner, other than a
pharmacist, to an ultimate user, no controlled substance in sched-
ule 1I or IV, which is a prescription drug as determined under the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. . .may be dispensed with-
out a written or oral prescription . . . [and it] may not be filled
or refilled more than six months after the date thereof or be refilled
more than five times after the date of the prescription unless re-
newed by the practitioner. 3'
One argument advanced against eliminating the efficacy require-
ment is that persons would be unable to exercise a real choice,
because they would be persuaded by false claims and appealing
sales techniques to demand unproven drugs. Congress, however, has
anticipated this problem and provided for FDA regulation of pre-
scription drug advertising. Basically, the manufacturer or distribu-
tor is required to include in all advertisements information relating
to side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness as required in
regulations issued by the Secretary." 5
If the efficacy provisions are eliminated, a great number of inef-
fective drugs may enter the market. While the individual's free
choice can be respected by eliminating the efficacy test for new
drugs, the standards for establishing effectiveness to the FDA's sat-
isfaction can be retained for a modified purpose. Drugs which have
not established effectiveness would be marketed but without the
FDA's approval as effective. Drugs which do satisfy the FDA stan-
132. 21 U.S.C. § 352(c) (1970).
133. Id. § 812 (1970).
134. Id. § 829(b) (1970). Somewhat more stringent requirements could possibly be applied
from 21 U.S.C. § 829(a) (1970).
135. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n)(3) (1970).
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dards would be removed from the newly created schedule and, de-
pending on the nature of the drug, enjoy less stringent prescription
regulations. The manufacturer could then present a specific, FDA
approved claim of effectiveness for the drug. This scheme serves the
FDA's purpose of encouraging the individual to choose established
medical treatments. Moreoever, the consumer will be better able to
evaluate the available drug options.
When combined with proper regulations to suit particular catego-
ries of new drugs, the above provisions are adequate to insure that
the individual is sufficiently informed of the drug's status; yet those
provisions would not restrict access to new drugs whose effectiveness
is unproven. Thus, the patient is presented with a meaningful
choice.
THE APPEAL To CONGRESS
Although the constitutional right to make certain fundamental
decisions may include the right of an individual to choose a course
of medical treatment which has not been established as effective,
the right has achieved limited recognition in the courts.' 3 Attacking
the procedure for NDA's requires overcoming the persuasive argu-
ment that "the fact that compliance might be expensive and bur-
densome is not unfairness in the procedure, but a consequence of a
reasonable Congressional scheme for the introduction of new
drugs.'"13
Whether the congressional scheme is in fact reasonable, is directly
related to the purpose for which the effectiveness requirement is
employed. Notwithstanding elimination of an efficacy requirement,
the safety of drugs would still have to be established. Thus the end
result of eliminating the latter requirement would be to release
harmless but possibly ineffective new drugs into the market. Chal-
lenges can continue to be made through the courts that preventing
unproven drugs from reaching the consumer is improper, since it
unnecessarily restricts freedom of choice in medical treatment.
However, an appeal to Congress would be more likely to achieve the
desired result and can bring about amendment to the Act in a
swifter, more certain manner.
Just as public reaction to drug related tragedy pressured the Con
gress in 1938 and 1962, '3 laetrile has found public support which has
motivated courts and legislatures to re-examine the FDCA. The
136. See Rutherford v. United States, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976).
137. Rutherford v. American Medical Association, 379 F.2d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 1967).
138. See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
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testimonials of citizens that laetrile has a curative effect has caused
state and federal legislatures to reconsider the wisdom of those in-
tensified requirements occasioned by those past disasters, particu-
larly when they defeat the availability of a drug with potential life-
saving qualities.
Recently, several state legislatures have attempted to legalize the
use of laetrile within their borders.139 The Illinois legislature recently
overrode Governor James Thompson's veto of a bill'" which ex-
empts laetrile from the state's food and drug law"' which requires
that a new drug have FDA approval before it can be sold within the
state.' It provides that no health care facility can restrict or pro-
hibit the use of laetrile when administered by a person licensed to
practice medicine.'
A basic and serious difficulty with such legislation is that the
FDA ban prevents shipment of laetrile into the state.'" It is not clear
in just what form the substance necessary to manufacture the drug
could be transported. "5 Such legislation may amount to little more
than a paper victory for laetrile supporters, although it may influ-
ence Congress.
The freedom of choice appeal is best directed at Congress, for it
is within its power to amend the Act to free all new drugs from the
efficacy requirement and avoid inevitable state-federal conflict.
Reconsideration of the efficacy requirement is in progress. Repre-
sentative Steven D. Symms has introduced a bill in the House to
''expand the medical freedom of choice of consumers by amending
the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act to provide that drugs will
be regulated under that Act solely to assure their safety.'" That
bill would eliminate the terms "effective," "effectiveness" and
"efficacy" from the Act, while adding a new paragraph "7 which
would provide that a drug is misbranded if it does not contain the
statement, "This drug has not been tested or reviewed for efficacy
by the Federal Government."'4 8 A similar bill, "Medical Freedom of
139. Chicago Sun-Times, June 22, 1977, at 50, col. 1.
140. Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 25, 1977, at 2, col. 1.
141. Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 18, 1977, at 3, col. 1.
142. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, § 517 (1973).
143. H.B. 1200.
144. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1970).
145. Laetrile is processed from apricot pits, but shipment of the pits themselves might
be prohibited by the FDA. See generally CuLaBa'r, supra note 3.
146. H.R. 54, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (referred Jan. 4, 1977 to the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.) [Hereinafter cited as H.R. 54].
147. 21 U.S.C. § 352(u) (legislation pending before the U.S. House of Representatives).
148. H.R. 54, supra note 146, at 2.
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Choice Act," has been introduced in the Senate by Senator Jesse
L. Helms."'
Passage of these bills is far from assured. However, the arguments
advanced by critics of the efficacy requirement will finally be pre-
sented to Congress, the most appropriate forum for consideration of
the FDCA's provisions.
CONCLUSION
The lack of FDA approval of a particular new drug is not equiva-
lent to a finding that the drug is ineffective. There are various
reasons why a particular drug may have unproven status. For in-
stance, the drug may not be proven effective by investigational
testing. Moreover, an NDA, although establishing effectiveness,
may be denied because of defects in the testing methods or because
of inadequate reports. The present status of the drug laetrile may
be attributed to the failure of a sponsor to assume the responsibility
for making application to the FDA and for conducting the required
testing. Although the debate continues over whether laetrile is effec-
tive in cancer treatment, the mere possibility that the drug may be
life saving should be an adequate incentive to Congress to reconsider
the efficacy standard of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
Congressional action cannot resolve all problems that confront
laetrile. Before the drug can be considered by the FDA, a manufac-
turer or distributor must assume the responsibility to sponsor an
NDA. Safety must be established and labeling must comply with
regulations. However, passage of the pending legislation can remove
the statutory efficacy barrier to new drugs and self determination
in drug treatment. The principle has been advanced and aptly
stated:
An individual cannot be deprived of the enjoyment of a constitu-
tional right, because some governmental organ may believe that it
is better for him and for others that he may not have this particular
enjoyment. The judgement as to that and the effects upon himself
therefrom are matters for his own responsibility.'"
BARBARA J. CLINITE
149. Chicago Sun-Times, June 22, 1977, at 50, col. 1.
150. Dove v. Parham, 282 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1960) (school desegregation).
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